Opinion: NEB review panel violated public trust
The most disturbing aspect of the National Energy Board Joint Review Panel’s report isn’t that it recommends approval for Northern Gateway. What is most disturbing is the false message it sends about the project’s risk.
Most British Columbians and First Nations, particularly in the north, understand the issues. They have considered the range of consequences with or without an accident. They have decided the risks are too great for the project to proceed.
The Panel’s view is that “a large spill is unlikely. We further found that a large spill would initially have significant adverse environmental effects on ecosystems, and we accepted the scientific evidence that indicates that the environment would ultimately recover and return to a functioning ecosystem similar to that existing prior to the spill.” The Panel is deliberately underplaying the environmental risk of Northern Gateway.
Of course large spills are unlikely. All catastrophic events are. The Deep Water Horizon BP event was unlikely, the San Bruno gas explosion that killed eight people and incinerated a San Francisco neighbourhood was unlikely, Enbridge’s largest inland crude oil release from Line 6B in Marshall, Michigan was unlikely, as was Lac Mégantic’s oil-by-rail tragedy that caused 47 deaths.
They are unlikely because they are caused by a series of relatively moderate errors that compound over time due to how businesses operate as a system. Dangerous behaviour is often enabled by inadequate government regulations or lax regulatory oversight.
The consequences of systemic error compound depending upon the area impacted and the product involved. Had Enbridge allowed more than 20,000 barrels of fresh water to escape over 17 hours from its pipeline in Michigan instead of toxic diluted bitumen the company would still be incompetent, but the consequences of its actions would not have been catastrophic.
More than $1 billion in costs and three-and-a-half years later, clean up is still ongoing. Just like the Exxon Valdez impact on Alaska’s shoreline, the Kalamazoo River ecosystem is far from its pre-spill condition.
In July 2012 the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that Enbridge’s spill release was “made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge.”
Kalamazoo happened two months after Enbridge filed its Application in May 2010. Obviously no information about the spill or its impacts was included in any of the original risk analysis supporting the project. Enbridge was unaware it suffered from a “culture of deviance from procedural adherence,” or that under pressure its management team behaves like “Keystone Kops.” That information wouldn’t be known until much later when the NTSB released its final report. The early work of the Panel was not informed by accurate risk assessments.
Over the course of the Panel’s deliberations, Intervenors were able to submit information requests to Northern Gateway. A number asked a multitude of questions regarding the Kalamazoo River spill.
They were interested in the clean up strategy, environmental impacts, behaviour of diluted bitumen in water, and other lessons learned. They wanted to know what went wrong and why. Kalamazoo was the first North American terrestrial diluted bitumen spill.
We would also expect the Panel was looking forward to the analysis provided by its US counterpart. In the meantime, it could request updated scientific risk analysis reports, which included Kalamazoo spill data as appropriate and available. But it didn’t.
As for Enbridge and its commitment to transparency, accountability and to building relationships, the company must have been eagerly awaiting the release of the NTSB study so it could address valid concerns. It promised no less in its ad campaigns. Just ask Janet.
Not so. Enbridge informed Interveners “ … information will not be provided as the cause of the incident is still under investigation by the NTSB. The NTSB has advised Enbridge not to comment on any specific details associated with the investigation until after the NTSB incident report is released.” It was as if Kalamazoo never happened.
OK, but after the report came out in July 2012 — even though the opportunity for information requests had passed — surely Enbridge would do the right thing and immediately provide answers.
No luck there either. As far as Enbridge and the Panel were concerned, Kalamazoo still hadn’t happened. It wasn’t until September 2012 after repeated Intervenor requests that Enbridge filed limited information.
What about the NTSB report and the myriad of supporting documents such as hundreds of interviews taken under oath — weren’t those filed as evidence? Nope. The Panel could have requested Enbridge file these but elected not to.
Two Intervenors submitted a notice of motion requesting the NTSB documents be filed. If reports are not filed they are not evidence and cannot be read or considered by the Panel. The Panel refused the Intervenors’ request saying they did not author the reports so could not submit them.
What about Enbridge? It was their spill. Couldn’t they file the reports? Not according to Enbridge. The company argued that “rules” prevented them from submitting the NTSB findings.
Three weeks after the NTSB report’s release I was interviewed on CBC radio. I raised concern that the Panel had refused to table the report. An interview with Federal Natural Resources Minister, Joe Oliver followed mine. He was questioned about the report’s absence. Unexpectedly, two days later the Panel changed its mind and requested Enbridge submit the report.
Enbridge never did update its risk assessments to reflect the Kalamazoo spill. The Panel never asked it to. Enbridge maintained throughout the review that dilbit did not sink.
The company submitted a Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment in May 2012 and updated this analysis to include enhanced pipe wall thickness and valve spacing in February 2013. Both these studies relied on statistics from 2002 — 2009. Not only was Kalamazoo ignored, the risk analysis assumed a 10 minute spill detection time followed by a 3-minute valve activation time — not 17 hours over three shift changes which is what happened with Kalamazoo.
Enbridge makes a habit of large spills. The 13-minute goal was developed in 1991 when Enbridge spilled almost 13,000 barrels of crude oil from its pipeline near Grand Rapids, Minnesota. This 20-year return period is a lot different than the 240 years predicted in the SQRA or the 464-year return period in its update.
The Panel chose not to give the NTSB report the serious attention it deserved. When Enbridge told the Panel it had changed its behaviour, the Panel essentially accepted Enbridge at face value. “We found Northern Gateway has taken steps to minimize the likelihood of a large spill through its precautionary design approach and its commitments … such as its commitment to address human error … and its corporate safety culture.”
When Enbridge depicted the Douglas Channel in its promotional video, it left out most of the islands that make transit treacherous. The Panel’s report is called Connections. It’s easy to predict low risk if you ignore most of the features that cause it.
Robyn Allan is an independent economist and former President and CEO of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia. She was an expert witness on insurance and risk at the Northern Gateway Hearings.
Access article: http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Opinion+review+panel+violated+public+trust/9370276/story.html#ixzz2qLwz2AqC